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This paper delves into the implications for the bank behaviour 
about firm loan pricing conditions of the new direction undertaken 
by supervisory and regulatory authorities in the aftermath of the 
deterioration of the loan portfolio quality that hit EU banks. The 
2014 AQR exercise embraces the new direction and extensively uses 
debt service coverage measures to assess a firm’s loan quality. We, 
therefore, check whether the DSCR has influenced debt pricing 
conditions by analysing a panel of 655 listed EU firms from 2009 to 
2017. Our findings show that Z-score is unable to discriminate 
between high and low credit risk firms. The DSCR becomes 
significant only after 2014, highlighting the incremented 
importance of this ratio in the bank’s loan pricing determination. 
Our work contributes to the literature investigating third-party 
interdependencies with the interplay between lender-borrower 
relationship and loan pricing and further extends the literature on 
creditworthiness metrics beyond their mere default-prediction 
ability (Beaver, 1966; Houghton & Woodliff, 1987). Our results 
highlight the relevance of the DSCR in the bank’s loan pricing 
determination and inform firm managers about the drivers that 
influence the cost of debt thereby enhancing their operational and 
financial planning. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), 
European banks experience a severe deterioration of 
their loan portfolio quality (EBA, 2016) that is 
further exacerbated by the sovereign-debt crisis that 
weakens the banking sector of some European 
countries. 
Supervisory and regulatory authorities 
intervene in undertaking a series of measures aimed 
at containing repercussions on bank lending, 
financial stability, and economic growth (ECB, 2020). 
Firms’ resilience is at stake as the impact on 
bank lending conditions may be material. This is 
particularly relevant for the euro area where bank 
loans represent more than 50% of the external 
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financing of both small and large non-financial 
enterprises (Altavilla, Canova, & Ciccarelli, 2019). As 
a comparison, the equivalent figure in the US  
is only 25%. 
To ensure a more effective bank’s lending and 
support firms in leading economic growth, 
supervisory and regulatory authorities address the 
NPL’s issue by undertaking measures that include  
a harmonized classification of non-performing 
exposures (EBA, 2013), clear identification criteria 
and provisioning instructions (ECB, 2017), and an 
enhanced impairment model (IFRS9). 
In detail, the EBA intervenes harmonizing the 
definition of NPLs in order to grant its consistency 
and comparability across the member states. The 
EBA’s Implementing Technical Standards distinguish 
between non-performing exposures (NPEs) and NPEs 
with forbearance measures. The former further 
consists of three different categories: 1) bad loans, 
2) unlikely-to-pay (UTP) and 3) past-due.  
The ECB’ Guidance to banks on NPLs sets out 
some criteria to identify the condition of the 
financial difficulty of the debtor. Moreover, the 
document sets out ECB’s expectations for prudent 
levels of provisions for new NPLs. Specifically, the 
ECB requires full coverage of the new secured and 
unsecured non-performing exposures within seven 
and two years, respectively (ECB, 2018). 
Regarding impairments, the IFRS9 introduces a 
forward-looking expected credit loss model for the 
calculation of provisions in order to replace the 
traditional incurred loss model for credit exposures. 
All these measures contribute to shaping the 
framework and approach of the comprehensive 
assessment undertaken by the ECB before assuming 
full responsibility for supervision under the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in November 2014. 
This is particularly evident for the Asset Quality 
Review (AQR), namely one of the two pillars of the 
assessment, together with the stress test, whose 
purpose is to enhance the transparency of bank 
exposures by reviewing the quality of banks’ assets, 
including the adequacy of asset and collateral 
valuation and related provisions. 
The AQR Phase 2 Manual uses a definition of 
financial difficulty which strictly relates to the 
consistency and level of cash flows and is crucial in 
qualifying an exposure as credit-impaired. 
More specifically, a material decrease in 
estimated future cash flows or a decrease of the 
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below the 
threshold of 1.1 qualify as minimum triggers of 
significant financial difficulty of the borrower.  
Thus, much importance is attributed to the 
EBITDA, as a proxy of the cash flows generated by a 
firm, and its related ratio the DSCR which is an 
indicator of dynamic debt repayment.  
As reported in the AQR Phase 2 Manual, the 
EBITDA is fundamental for three purposes: a) forming 
indicators for the exposure’s classification; 
b) identifying debtor’s financial difficulties; c) setting 
the level of provisions on a going concern.  
To sum up, the new direction undertaken by 
supervisory and regulatory authorities marks a 
turning point from backward-looking to forward-
looking logics and measures that ground on the 
evaluation of cash flows and aim to anticipate 
dynamics instead of registering them ex-post. 
Thus, the research question that this paper 
seeks to answer is how this new approach is 
affecting the bank-firm relationship. We focus on the 
effects of ECB’s loan valuation metrics on third-party 
pricing policies. In particular, give its extensive use 
in the AQR exercise, we assess the impact of the 
debt service coverage ratio on the bank behavior 
about firm loan pricing conditions. 
We, therefore, contribute to the literature 
investigating third-party interdependencies with the 
interplay between lender-borrower relationship and 
loan pricing (Kim, Song, & Tsui, 2012; Byrne &  
Kelly, 2019). As the role of the ECB has been merely 
addressed studying the policy rate pass-through to 
lending rates, we offer a novel perspective assessing 
the impact of debt service coverage metrics used in 
the AQR on the firm’s cost of debt, thereby 
considering a measure of dynamic debt repayment 
and further extending the literature on such ratios 
beyond their mere default-prediction ability (Beaver, 
1966; Houghton & Woodliff, 1987). 
Our sample consists of 655 EU-listed firms in 
eleven EU countries. We collect annual firm financial 
data from the Amadeus (Bureau Van Dyke) database 
over the period 2009-2017. 
We, therefore, employ a fixed effect panel data 
regression to evaluate the ability of DSCR measures 
in explaining the level of debt pricing. 
Our main result points out that the DSCR 
becomes statistically significant in explaining the 
firm’s cost of debt only after the introduction of this 
measure within the AQR exercise of 2014.  
This result is relevant both for the implications 
for banks’ net-interest margins and for the large 
dependence of corporate financing to bank lending. 
Moreover, it has several implications for both 
policymakers and managers. Regarding the former, 
our result suggests the relevance gained by the 
DSCR by bank managers for the determination of 
loan pricing conditions thereby supporting the 
effectiveness of the new direction undertaken by 
supervisory and regulatory authorities.  
Regarding management, on one hand, bank 
managers introduce into lending practices a 
simplistic tool that provides a straightforward 
output and further fully embraces the new 
regulatory and supervisory approach. On the other 
hand, firm managers understand the drivers that 
influence the cost of debt thereby they can better 
plan their operational and financial strategies. The 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature; Section 3 describes the DSCR 
and disentangles it in its main drivers; Section 4 
outlines the research design; Section 5 provides the 
results; Section 6 concludes and highlights the 
managerial and policy implications.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Credit scoring is a statistical method used to predict 
the probability that a loan applicant or existing 
borrower will default or become delinquent  
(Mester, 1997). Banks may use scoring to develop 
risk-related loan pricing but is essential for the users 
to understand the economic value of the models and 
to integrate such information into traditional lending 
practices in a profitable manner (Stein, 2005).  
Quantitative credit risk modelling has come a 
long way since the Altman’s Z-score. The first 
modern-day quantitative model of credit risk was 
based on a multivariate discriminant analysis of five 
accounting ratios. Despite being still useful for many 
market players (Benzschawel, 2012), the Z-score has 
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been criticized for being backward-looking and 
intermittent, as accounting ratios are based on 
historical data. Therefore, credit risk modelling has 
evolved into structural and reduced-from models 
(Zamore, Djan, Alon, & Hobdari, 2018).  
Although, replaced by more advanced 
techniques, the employment of debt service coverage 
measures by the ECB in the 2014 AQR exercise to 
assess the firm’s loan quality may have resumed the 
role of credit scores in the bank lending process. In 
particular, the score may influence loan pricing 
conditions, and this assumes particular relevance for 
its implications for the banks’ net-interest margins 
and overall profitability. 
This is relevant also for borrowers as in the 
euro area corporate financing is predominantly bank 
rather than market-based (de Bondt et al., 2005). 
Bank loans represent, indeed, more than 50% of the 
external financing of both small and large non-
financial corporations (Altavilla et al., 2019). 
Changes in lending conditions may, therefore, affect 
the level of economic activity and welfare.  
Literature has extensively investigated the 
lender-borrower relationship and its impact on loan 
pricing. The intensity of the relationship is found to 
be crucial in explaining loan pricing (Gabbi, 
Giammarino, Matthias, Monferrà, & Sampagnaro, 
2020) as well as borrower and lender characteristics. 
Regarding the impact of borrower’s 
characteristics on loan pricing, Bharath, Sunder, and 
Sunder (2008) provide evidence of loan interest rates 
being lower for borrowers with higher accounting 
quality. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) show that 
borrower financial restatements increase loan rates. 
Zhang (2008) finds that loan interest rates are 
negatively related to borrower accounting 
conservatism. Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam 
(2009) investigate the impact of borrower 
governance characteristics on loan pricing and show 
that takeover defenses are negatively associated 
with loan rates. Chen, King, and Wen (2020) examine 
the link between non-executive employee ownership 
and the terms and pricing of corporate loans 
pointing out the negative effect of non-executive 
employee ownership on loan spreads.  
Specularly, a strand of literature is dedicated to 
the interplay between lender characteristics and loan 
pricing. Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) consider 
bank capital and show that low-capital banks tend to 
charge higher loan rates than well-capitalized banks. 
Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002) investigate the 
impact of several lender characteristics and show 
that bank monitoring ability, bargaining power, risk, 
and syndicate structure have a significant influence 
in determining loan maturity and pricing.  
Among the external factors like the political 
(Delis, Hasan, & Ongena, 2020; Ashraf & Shen, 2019) 
and regulatory environment (Chen, Mazumdar, & 
Yan, 2000), third parties’ characteristics, such as 
size and tenure of borrower’s auditors, are found to 
be relevant in explaining loan interest rates. In this 
regard, Kim et al. (2012) find that the loan interest 
rate is significantly lower for borrowers with 
prestigious Big 4 auditors than for borrowers with 
non-Big 4 auditors. Moreover, auditor tenure is 
negatively associated with the loan interest rate, 
suggesting that a long client-auditor relationship 
lowers the loan borrowing cost. 
Of particular interest to the purpose of this 
paper is the role played by the ECB. Literature has 
focused on monetary policy decisions and their 
impact on the interest rates set by banks for lending 
operations. In particular, an extensive strand  
of literature has examined the interest rate  
pass-through concluding that bank rates are sticky 
in the short term, i.e., changes in short-term market 
interest rates are not immediately fully reflected in 
bank interest rates. de Bondt et al. (2005) and 
Camba-Mendez et al. (2016) show that the pass-
through of short-term to long-term rates in the euro 
area plays a key role in the determination of bank 
lending rates and their sluggishness. Moreover, 
Byrne and Kelly (2019) link the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy pass-through to the bank asset 
quality pointing out that distressed loan books may 
hamper the adjustment of lending pricing in 
response to changes in the policy rate.  
Regarding the ECB comprehensive assessment, 
Steffen (2014) has questioned the robustness, 
validity, and significance of both asset quality review 
and stress test. Moreover, Acharya and Steffen 
(2014a, 2014b) estimated the capital shortfalls of 
European banks and compare their results with 
those of the ECB assessment. The results diverge 
significantly and authors attribute such divergence 
to the continued reliance on static risk-weights in 
the regulatory assessment. 
However, the literature does not link ECB 
supervisory or regulatory measures to loan pricing. 
On an international regulatory level, instead, few 
studies have addressed this question investigating 
the association between Basel rules, specifically 
credit risk measurement techniques, to loan pricing. 
Repullo and Suarez (2004) show that low-risk firms 
overcome increases in their loan rates by borrowing 
from banks adopting the IRB approach whereas 
high-risk firms do the same by borrowing from 
banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized 
approach. Moreover, Ruthenberg and Landskroner 
(2008) find that low-risk corporate customers can 
reduce loan interest rates by interacting with large 
banks that, most probably, adopt an IRB approach, 
whereas high-risk corporate customers can enjoy the 
same reduction by shifting to small banks that, most 
probably, adopt a standardized approach.  
Our work, therefore, attempts to close this gap. 
Given that the regulatory environment in which 
banks operate significantly affects the loan rate 
(Chen et al., 2000), we investigate the impact of 
ECB’s loan valuation metrics employed in the 2014 
AQR exercise on loan pricing conditions. As a result, 
we contribute with a novel point of view to the loan 
pricing literature and further assess an ECB 
supervisory measure so far unnoticed by scholars. 
 
3. DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE RATIOS 
 
Although the AQR Phase 2 Manual (2014) does not 
specify the exact calculation of DSCR, the most 
commonly used formula for this ratio is the 
following: 
 
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 =
𝑁𝑂𝐶𝐹
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
 (1) 
 
where NOCF is the net operating cash flow, calculated 
as earnings before interest, taxes depreciation, and 
amortizations (EBITDA), minus taxes, and the 
variations in net operating working capital 
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(inventories plus working receivables minus working 
debts). The ratio focuses on the ability to repay the 
medium to long-term debt and interest expense, 
thus debt repayment stands only for this part of the 
debt. 
Assuming that long-term changes in the net 
operating working capital have a reduced influence 
on cash flows or at most a negligible shifting effect 
over the observed period of time, the formula 
becomes as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 −  𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
 (2) 
 
Unfortunately, using publicly available data, it is 
impossible to know a company’s annual financial 
commitments in terms of loan repayments. 
Therefore, in this study, the medium to long-term 
debt duration is commensurate with the residual life 
of the fixed assets usually financed by these loans: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) ≅ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 +  𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 (3) 
 
Thus, the DSCR formula becomes: 
 
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 −  𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚/𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  +  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
  (4) 
 
A ratio of more than 1 indicates sufficient capacity 
to cover the financial commitments of the firm. 
However, the AQR should use a higher threshold of 
1.1 to be considered safe.  
The AQR also uses an indicator to measure 
whether all of the company’s financial debt (both 
medium to long-term debt and short-term debt) can 
be repaid out of the company’s EBITDA, fixing a 
threshold of six years: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
 ≤  6 (5) 
 
Using the DSCR coverage logic in terms of unity, we 
can formulate the second version of this ratio as 
follows (that we can dub Total DSCR): 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 ∙ 6
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 (6) 
 
The above ratio should be higher than 1 (or 1.1 in 
the ECB’s prudential logic). 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We are interested in testing how DSCR and  
Total DSCR influence the firm’s debt pricing 
compared to a more traditional risk measure  
such as the Z-score.  
We collect annual firm financial data from 
Amadeus (Bureau Van Dyke) database. From the 
universe of EU companies, we create the sample 
setting the following criteria: 1) the company is 
listed; 2) the latest year of accounts is 2017, and 
3) the status is active. Thus, our sample includes all 
EU-listed firms available in Amadeus: 655 firms in 
11 EU countries (BE, BG, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, LU, SE, 
SK) over the years 2009-2017. We focus on listed 
firms because we can calculate the traditional and 
full version of the Z-score, which is influenced by 
market capitalization. The starting period of our 
sample corresponds to the first available financial 
year of the dataset.  
The dataset presents some missing data and a 
set of outlying observations. The first step in our 
analysis considered the deletion of some anomalous 
values. These have been identified as outliers in the 
distribution of the explanatory variables. To avoid 
the introduction of subjective assumptions during 
data completion, we decided to face the issue of 
outliers using a listwise deletion approach. 
Considering the specific model matrices, the final 
sample size was reduced from 7,191 observations to 
5,634 observations (699 units observed from 1 to  
9 times; 8.06 is the average number of observations 
per unit).  
Exploiting a research design similar to that 
used in Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) 
and Van der Bauwhede, De Meyere, and  
Van Cauwenberge (2015), we tested the ability of 
DSCR measures to explain the level of debt pricing. 
We implemented a fixed effect panel data 
regression: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑁𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (7) 
 
where j = 1 to N identifies the firms and t = 1 to T is 
the time indicator. Cost is the annual cost of debt 
calculated by dividing interest expense by total debt. 
Country, Nace, Size, and Rate constitute control 
variables: Country is a factor variable that represents 
the country in which the firm has its headquarters; 
Nace is a factor variable representing the type of 
industry; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Rate is 
the official interest rate applied by the ECB  
(macro-economic control variable). CR is the variable 
expressing the firm’s credit risk declined in four 
configurations; and 𝜕𝑖 is the individual effect. The 
Hausmann test is used to decide between fixed or 
random effects.  
The firms’ credit risk measure is considered in 
four different configurations. The first is the pure 
value of the classic Altman (1968) Z-score (Model 1). 
The second is represented by a factor variable that 
identifies the levels of Z-score (Model 2): the Z-score 2 
is 1, if the Z-score is defined in the interval [1.8; 3] 
(in this range the Z-score is not always able to 
separate defaulted from non-defaulted firms) and 
zero otherwise, and the Z-score 3 is 1 if the Z-score 
is at least equal to 3 (above this value the Z-score 
Risk Governance & Control: Financial Markets & Institutions / Volume 10, Issue 2, 2020 
 
49 
identifies low-risk default firms) and zero otherwise. 
The third is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the DSCR 
is at least equal to 1.1 and zero otherwise (Model 3). 
The fourth is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
Total DSCR is equal to or greater than 1.1 and zero 
otherwise (Model 4). In Model 3 and Model 4, the 
DSCR effect is integrated with two control variables 
that are the variation in firm sales and the 
capitalization level (Equity to Total Assets) that are 
both used in the AQR exercise. The estimation of the 
panel models is based on the transformation. The 
transformation is used to solve the well-known 
incidental parameters issue; however, as a 
consequence, the effects of the time-invariant 
variables are also depleted. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Valid observations Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Cost: dependent variable 5989 -0.0241 0.3235 0.0665 0.0517 0.0516 
Size 6705 7.0926 19.8610 12.9172 12.6127 2.3198 
Rate 6705 0.0000 0.0100 0.0046 0.0025 0.0044 
Cap 6705 -10.2192 0.9856 0.4324 0.4281 0.2785 
Var. Sales 6569 -1.0000 0.6747 0.0252 0.0307 0.1796 
DSCR 6119 -16.0726 38.1095 5.4069 3.4455 6.7883 
Total DSCR 5831 -11.4194 30.9608 3.7914 2.1907 4.9441 
Dummy DSCR 6119   0.8438   
Dummy Total DSCR 5831   0.7644   
Z-score 6624 -5.3586 11.7202 2.6384 2.3176 1.6024 
Z-score 1 6624   0.3092   
Z-score 2 6624   0.3931   
Z-score 3 6624   0.2977   
Note: This table provides the summary statistics for the variables used in regressions (7). The sample consists of 655 firms 
corresponding to a maximum of 6705 observations regarding the period 2009-2017. 
 
The descriptive statistics show that the Cost 
assumes an asymmetric distribution. It presents a 
few negative values, which are not included in the 
dataset used for the model estimation (because the 
records present some missing values). The studied 
phenomenon presents an asymmetric distribution 
and, as most of the economic variables, it assumes 
positive values only. Given these characteristics,  
a data stabilization transformation is adopted here 
as a preliminary data treatment procedure. In 
particular, the logarithmic transformation of the 
dependent variable (Box & Cox, 1964) is considered.  
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The Z-score shows a positive and statistically 
significant correlation with the firm’s cost of debt. 
This result is consistent across the two configurations 
of the Z-score of pure value and factor variable in 
Model 1 and Model 2. The positive correlation with 
the cost of debt suggests that third-party lenders do 
not raise prices when firms are near default 
(Beltrame et al., 2017). As a result, we deem the  
Z-score unable to discriminate between high and low 
credit risk firms. 
Regarding the flow variables used in the AQR 
exercise, both DSCR dummy and sales variation 
show a negative and statistically significant 
correlation with the firm’s cost of debt over the full 
period in Model 3. This result can be easily 
explained by the great dependence of provisioning 
from those two indicators. Moreover, with respect to 
the temporal differentiation, it is interesting to 
notice that the DSCR dummy manifests a significant 
explanatory power of debt pricing in the 2014-2017 
period. In particular, the dummy becomes 
statistically significant only after the introduction of 
the ratio within the framework and logics of the 
2014 ECB’s AQR. As regards third-party 
interdependencies with the interplay between 
lender-borrower relationship and loan pricing, this 
result is explained by the ECB’s smoothly 
transmission of the new approach to banks by which 
the DSCR has become important for the 
determination of loan pricing conditions and has 
alerted firms regarding the key drivers of the cost of 
debt that need to be taken into account when 
planning operational and financial strategies. 
On the contrary to the DSCR dummy and 
similarly to Z-score results, the Total DSCR dummy 
shows a positive and statistically significant 
correlation with the firm’s cost of debt in Model 4. 
Thus, coherently with the explanation of the Z-score 
results, the 6x threshold for financial debt on 
EBITDA does not constitute a general proxy to 
separate good and bad debt service firms. In fact, 
the Total DSCR dummy presents stable values 
among firms and for all of the sample period. 
Another explanation about the different signs of two 
DSCR dummy measures is that the amount of debt 
(long- and short-term) itself is not able to describe 
clearly firm financial conditions, letting more 
significant the comparison between cash flow and 
debt service. 
Regarding control variables, the size shows a 
negative and statistically significant correlation with 
the firm’s cost of debt over the full period. This 
result is consistent across all four models. The 
negative relationship between size and debt pricing 
suggests that larger firms tend to pay less because 
those firms enjoy economies of scale and greater 
stability (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003).  
The official interest rate set out by the ECB 
shows a positive and statistically significant 
correlation with the firm’s cost of debt over all 
periods considered. This result is in line with the 
extensive literature on the policy rate pass-through 
to lending rates.  
Regarding the two control variables employed 
in Model 3 and Model 4, the sales variation, as 
abovementioned, shows a negative and statistically 
significant correlation with debt pricing over the full 
period in Model 3. The result is further validated in 
Model 4. The explanation is that a sales reduction 
triggers higher levels of provisioning that the bank 
reflects in higher lending rates. 
Finally, the capitalization level does not show a 
statistically significant relationship with the firm’s 
cost of debt over the full period. The result is 
consistent in both Model 3 and Model 4. 
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Table 2. Cost of debt and credit risk measures 
 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
2009-2013 2014-2017 Full period 2009-2013 2014-2017 Full period 2009-2013 2014-2017 Full period 2009-2013 2014-2017 Full period 
Size 
-0.0509 0.0032 -0.0530** -0.0510 0.0040 -0.0520** -0.0502 0.0107 -0.0475** -0.0511 0.0119 -0.0470** 
(0.0392) (0.0493) (0.0230) (0.0396) (0.0497) (0.0231) (0.0396) (0.0500) (0.0231) (0.0396) (0.0499) (0.0231) 
Rate 
11.5067*** 0.0291*** 27.6425*** 9.9527*** 0.0276*** 26.6720*** 9.0326*** 254.8589*** 25.6474*** 9.1040*** 253.4101*** 25.8194*** 
(2.4665) (0.3297) (1.4769) (2.4796) (0.3304) (1.4730) (2.4807) (33.0112) (1.4699) (2.4809) (32.9679) (1.4669) 
Z-score 
0.1255*** 0.1305*** 0.0881***                   
(0.0159) (0.0181) (0.0101)                   
Z-score 1/2 
      0.0818*** 0.1473*** 0.0856***             
      (0.0308) (0.0383) (0.0239)             
Z-score 2/3 
      0.1865*** 0.2799*** 0.1824***             
      (0.0437) (0.0519) (0.0327)             
DSCR 
            -0.0441 -0.0789** -0.0566**       
            (0.0297) (0.0375) (0.0235)       
Total DSCR 
                    0.1728*** 0.1841*** 
                    (0.0558) (0.0587) 
Var. Sales 
            0.0120 -0.0669 -0.0884** -0.0056 -0.1069* -0.1190*** 
            (0.0467) (0.0636) (0.0404) (0.0453) (0.0632) (0.0392) 
Cap 
            0.5576*** 0.1151* 0.0363 0.5003*** 0.1000 0.0266 
            (0.1038) (0.0644) (0.0373) (0.0122) (0.0641) (0.0372) 
Obs. 2906 2392 5298 2906 2392 5298 2906 2392 5298 2906 2392 5298 
R-squared 0.0344 0.0624 0.0874 0.0344 0.0504 0.0811 0.0206 0.0393 0.0778 0.0196 0.0421 0.0786 
Note: This table shows the estimation results on the effect of credit risk measures on the firm’s cost of debt for a sample of 655 firms over the 2009-2017 period. In all regressions, we estimated the 
regression model of equation (7) using the four configurations of credit risk measures alternatively. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper studies the implications of the ECB’s loan 
valuation metrics on third-party pricing policies. We 
investigate the implications of the extensive use  
of the DSCR in the 2014 ECB’s AQR on pricing 
conditions applied by banks to the loans to firms.  
We employ a sample of 655 EU-listed firms that 
covers the period 2009-2017. Our main result points 
out the significant role of the DSCR in explaining the 
firm’s cost of debt after its introduction in the 2014 
ECB’s AQR exercise. 
From an academic standpoint, our work 
contributes to the branch of literature investigating 
third-party interdependencies with the interplay 
between lender-borrower relationships and loan 
pricing. The novelty of our contribution lies in our 
focus on the creditworthiness metrics employed by 
the ECB instead of considering the broadly 
investigated policy rate pass-through to lending 
rates. Moreover, we further extend the literature on 
creditworthiness metrics by considering a measure 
of dynamic debt repayment and going beyond their 
mere default-prediction ability by studying their 
impact on the firm cost of debt. 
From a practical standpoint, our paper provides 
evidence to policymakers about the effectiveness of 
the change of course undertaken in the aftermath of 
the deterioration of the loan portfolio quality that 
hit EU banks. In detail, the metrics adopted by  
the ECB to valuate loans have been effectively 
incorporated by bank managers into lending 
processes for the determination of loan pricing 
conditions. Moreover, bank managers also benefit 
from a simplistic tool that provides a straightforward 
output and whose economic meaning fully embraces 
the rationale behind the new approach. 
Finally, further implications can be drawn for 
the banks’ net-interest margins and overall 
profitability. 
Important implications emerge also for 
borrowers, as firm managers can derive from the 
decomposition of the DSCR the main drivers that 
have to be managed to improve the score and obtain 
better pricing conditions. Moreover, knowing the 
drivers of the cost of debt may help firm managers 
to better plan their operational and financial 
strategies. 
The range of these implications could be 
relevant given that in the euro area corporate 
financing is predominantly bank-based and bank 
loans represent more than 50% of the external 
financing of both small and large firms.  
As regards the limits of this study we point out 
the inclusion in our sample of only EU-listed firms. 
We suggest, therefore, future research that would 
contribute to this study to include unlisted firms in 
the sample in order to determine the total effect for 
the EU economies. Given the crucial role of 
enterprises in leading economic growth, further 
implications may be derived regarding the level of 
economic activity and welfare. In this regard, the 
recent COVID-19 outbreak poses a serious threat  
to the firms’ resilience and this supports the 
importance of our study as the DSCR will become 
much more crucial to assess firm creditworthiness 
and its drivers will become decisive for firms to plan 
strategies that lead them out from the crisis. We, 
therefore, call for future research on the interplay 
between the drivers of the cost of debt highlighted 
in this study and firm resilience during the time of 
coronavirus. 
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